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 Beyond the New Deal: Global 
 Collaboration and Peacebuilding 
 with BRICS Countries
Reluctant collaborators: BRICS engagement 
with the International Dialogue on 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
In recent years the International Dialogue on 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding has been the locus 
of multilateral efforts to formulate coordinated 
aid approaches in fragile and conflict-affected 
states. It was established as a mechanism for 
consultation and deliberation on why the existing 
international aid and development regime was 
failing. The Dialogue includes the g7+ countries, a 
body representing the governments of at least 
19 fragile and conflict-affected countries, which 
was established at a 2010 Ministerial-level 
meeting in Dili. 
The Dialogue was instrumental in developing the 
New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States, 
which established five Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding Goals (around inclusive political 
settlement and people’s access to security, justice, 
service delivery and employment). OECD-DAC 
donors support the governments of fragile and 
conflict-affected countries to meet these goals 
by adhering to a new set of commitments to 
provide and manage aid. Aid recipient countries 
sign ‘country compacts’ with donor countries and 
engage in mutual confidence-building measures, 
such as institution building and governance 
reforms. 
The International Dialogue made a concerted 
effort to include BRICS members and China and 
Brazil decided to join. However, their participation 
has been patchy to date. For example, Brazil sent a 
junior delegate to the first International Dialogue 
meeting in Dili, East Timor, in 2010, but then did 
not participate in the second or third meetings held 
in Monrovia, Liberia, in 2011 and Washington DC, 
USA, in 2013. 
While the New Deal has been broadly welcomed 
by OECD-DAC donors and ‘fragile’ countries, 
BRICS countries have not signed up despite their 
widening engagement in these countries, including 
through technical assistance, debt cancellation or 
reduction, foreign direct investment and security 
cooperation. 
Given the reluctance of BRICS countries to engage 
with the International Dialogue, it is unsurprising 
that they have not endorsed the New Deal. Beijing 
and Brasília have viewed the New Deal as an 
OECD initiative that seeks to socialise OECD and 
non-OECD donors alike into existing western-
dominated aid structures. Western attitudes 
to justice, interventionism, accountability, 
www.ids.ac.uk
Po
lic
y B
R
IE
FI
N
G
 
ISSUE 59 • APRIL 2014
Development in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is both complex and 
contested. The New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States, endorsed by 35 
countries and six organisations, is the current focus of efforts to harmonise aid 
approaches. Yet, BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
are charting their own individual approaches for promoting development and 
peacebuilding in conflict-affected states. 
This policy brief examines opportunities for Western donors to deepen 
collaboration with BRICS countries, and suggests that focusing on peacebuilding, 
aligning financial assistance in post-conflict reconstruction, and furthering 
cooperation in peacekeeping are all entry points to extend cooperation beyond 
the New Deal.
transparency and the role of conditionality 
differ from those of BRICS countries, mainly 
due to their diverging developmental 
experiences. Rejecting the discourse of ‘failed 
states’, BRICS countries have objected to the 
‘fragility’ and ‘vulnerability’ assessment criteria 
developed through the International Dialogue. 
The fact that China, Russia and India are all 
grappling with ongoing domestic insurgencies 
has also shaped their rather critical stance on 
the New Deal and, more generally, formed their 
positions with respect to international efforts 
to promote stability and ease conflict in what 
are deemed fragile states. The complex politics 
underlying the positions of different BRICS 
countries in fragile and conflict-affected states 
is evident in Syria (see box on page 3).
Toward greater cooperation in fragile 
and conflict-affected states
The diplomatic, security and economic 
contributions of BRICS countries are crucial for 
lasting peacebuilding and development in fragile 
and conflict-affected states. While they may 
have shied away from greater involvement in 
the International Dialogue and New Deal, there 
are three areas where greater cooperation is 
possible between OECD donors and BRICS 
countries: promoting a focus on peacebuilding, 
including support to regional organisations, 
financial assistance in supporting reconstruction 
and peacekeeping operations.
1 Greater cooperation in peacebuilding
BRICS countries have, in general, rejected 
intervention framed in terms of ‘statebuilding’ 
and rescuing ‘failed states’. Most of them adhere 
to principles of national sovereignty, non-
interference and non-intervention, very much 
in line and in tradition with the policies of the 
Non-Aligned Movement. BRICS foreign policy 
remains strongly grounded in the ‘Bandung 
principles’, whose adherents underscore the 
integrity of sovereign states and their opposition 
to external interference. However, there are 
cases of BRICS countries supporting 
statebuilding activities in certain political 
contexts, including Brazil in East Timor and 
South Africa in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (although they would not describe this 
as ‘statebuilding’). 
Support to domestic peacebuilding efforts 
dwarfs statebuilding as the main thrust of BRICS 
engagement in fragile and conflict-affected 
countries, as shown by the active involvement 
of Brazil and South Africa in the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission. For the first time 
in its history, China deployed combat troops as 
part of a UN mission in Mali alongside the 
Economic Community of West Africa States 
(ECOWAS). China also contributed non-combat 
troops to the African Union/UN Hybrid 
operation in Darfur (UNAMID). 
2 Financial aid in post-conflict reconstruction
Most BRICS countries (except South Africa) 
concentrate their aid spending in rehabilitating 
infrastructure in war-ravaged societies. China 
believes that reforms aimed at reducing 
poverty and instability through economic 
development should be prioritised in conflict-
affected states. In fact, it argues that the 
establishment of liberal democratic systems is 
not a peacebuilding requirement and that each 
country should be free to form a political 
system and governance structures that are 
appropriate to their context. India has funnelled 
much of its assistance to Afghanistan, focusing 
on infrastructure development, education, and 
health. Brazil focuses on the rehabilitation of 
railway infrastructure and technical training 
linked to agricultural development as shown in 
its recent interventions in Mozambique. 
3 Strengthening UN peacekeeping operations
India is one of the top three contributing 
countries to UN peacekeeping operations, 
behind only Bangladesh and Pakistan. A number 
of Indian security experts hold senior positions 
in the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
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Operations. The Centre for United Nations 
Peacekeeping in New Delhi has trained over 
400 officers from more than 70 countries and 
has ongoing instructor-exchange programmes 
with other peacekeeping training centres in 
Australia, Germany and Canada. Brazil has also 
assumed a more important role, leading the 
peacekeeping component of the United Nations 
Stabilisation Mission In Haiti (MINUSTAH). 
China’s peacekeeping contributions to UN 
missions have also increased in recent years and 
it now contributes more troops and police to 
UN peacekeeping missions than any other 
permanent members of the UN Security 
Council. The Chinese government has shown 
greater interest in funding and coordinating 
training facilities where Chinese peacekeeping 
contingents can come into contact and share 
knowledge and technical expertise with troops 
from other nationalities. In 2010, Chinese 
peacekeeping police and US troops carried out 
their first joint patrol in Haiti. The European 
Union (EU) and its member states have also 
intensified cooperation with China in a number 
of security-related fields. This cooperation has 
emphasised ‘soft security’ activities such as 
strategic dialogues, military-to-military 
diplomacy and educational exchanges, port 
visits, peacekeeping training, and some joint 
military exercises. China has established formal 
defence-related consultative dialogues with 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The 
EU has sought to strengthen ties with China in 
developing the African Union’s Peace and 
Security Architecture. 
Contradictory positions on Syria’s civil war? 
The involvement of BRICS countries has been significant in shaping international efforts to address Syria’s 
ongoing war, and will be pivotal to its eventual resolution. They have all opposed any outside military solution, 
particularly any action that is not authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Brazil has urged the UNSC 
to order an immediate end to the flow of arms into Syria, Russia was supported by fellow BRICS countries 
for its deal with Washington on chemical weapons while China sent experts to help oversee their inspection 
and destruction.
 
The BRICS are broadly aligned in supporting inclusive political dialogue, endorsing the Joint Communique of 
the Geneva Action Group at the BRICS Summit in March 2013. As early as 2011, India, Brazil and South Africa 
issued a declaration calling for an ‘end to violence’ and an ‘all-inclusive, transparent, peaceful political process’ 
– blaming both sides for the unrest, and offering to send their own envoy to help mediate talks. 
However, the BRICS’ ‘non-interventionist’ positions are complicated by their pre-existing bilateral trade, security 
and diplomatic ties with Syria. Bilateral trade with China increased to almost US$2.5 billion in 2010, a surge of 
nearly 12 per cent over the previous year, just before the conflict broke out. Currently China is Syria’s main 
importer. The partnership between Damascus and Moscow also runs deep. Russian defence industry contracts 
are valued at more than US$4 billion. Some observers argue that a prolonged conflict would actually be in 
Moscow’s interest given the potential for increased arms sales. Syria and its neighbours are increasingly a 
destination for Indian investment and joint ventures, while Syrian President Assad’s regime has backed India’s 
position on Kashmir and supported its aspirations for a permanent UNSC seat. Brazil, which also seeks a seat 
on the UNSC, has been careful to show ‘pragmatism’ and has studiously avoided staking out a position that 
could be interpreted as being aligned with one side or the other.
Policy recommendations
Engagement between OECD-DAC and BRICS donors must focus on trust 
building and there are a number of areas in which Western donors can cultivate 
stronger cooperation with the BRICS countries.
 • Collaboration in peacebuilding by providing further political support, financial 
and technical assistance, and troop deployments to peacebuilding efforts 
headed by regional organisations.
 • Financial aid and post-conflict reconstruction, being the preferred focus of 
intervention for BRICS countries, is an entry point for developing dialogue on 
the pre-requisites for longer-term stability and peace. OECD – DAC donors 
have a role to play in promoting conflict sensitive approaches in reconstruction 
and investment as well as adherence to international codes relating to land 
investment and resource extraction, which are often part of broader packages 
of reconstruction support.
 • Strengthening UN peacekeeping operations. Building on BRICS countries’ 
substantial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations to date, OECD – 
DAC donors can improve both collaboration and coherence by renewing their 
own commitments to UN-backed efforts. This may include cooperation in 
providing training and technical expertise as well as funding to UN peacekeeping 
operations.
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